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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's enigmatic Monadology, written in 1714, is Leibniz's 
most succinct and systematic outline of his metaphysics of monads and rightly 
recognized as a pivotal text in the history of philosophy. It opens with a concise 
definition of the central notion:  
 
THE MONAD, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance 
that enters into composites—simple, that is, without parts (Theodicy, sec. 10). 
(Monadology, §1: GP VI 607; AG 213) 
 
As substances, monads are forces. The true nature of substance, Leibniz claims to 
have discovered in the early 1690s, consists in force (On the Correction of 
Metaphysics: GP IV 469; L 433. See also New System: GP IV 472: L 454). All true 
substances are also indivisible unities, for, as Leibniz said in his 30 April 1687 letter 
to Arnauld, ‘what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either’ (GP II 97; LA 
121). But even though a monad is one being, it is not a solitary being. A single 
indivisible monad can only enter into composite, divided, extended bodies in 
conjunction with other monads. There exists an infinite plurality of monads that 
together ground the infinitely divided material world. Without a plurality of monads, 
there would be no material world.  
 
However, monads do not enter into composite bodies as physical parts. For Leibniz, 
parts are by definition always homogenous with the whole. The parts of an extended 
body are smaller bodies, all of which are essentially extended and divided. The 
division of matter hence proceeds to infinity; every body however small is divided in 
further extended and divided parts. Monads are indivisible unities and cannot 
therefore be homogeneous parts of divided aggregate extended things. They are not 
physical atoms. The role of the monads is quite different, for they are not only 
indivisible unities, but also indivisible unifiers. Each monad is a metaphysical atom, 
dominant over a subset of subordinate monads that it unifies to form with itself what 
Leibniz calls a ‘corporeal substance’ (To De Volder, 20 June 1703: LV 264-265). 
Corporeal substances are living, animal-like creatures, comprising the unifying 
dominant monad – a mind, soul or entelechy – and the subordinate monads that it 
unites with itself to form the whole living creature. Each subordinate monad is itself 
dominant over the monads in its own organic body. These dominated monads are in 
turn dominant over further subordinate monads in their own organic bodies. Thus the 
universe of monads is a universe of monads whose organic bodies have monads with 
their organic bodies enfolded within them, to infinity.  
 
A plurality of monads requires that each monad is identifiably distinct from all the 
others. As indivisible, they cannot be distinguished by their parts, but they can be 
distinguished by their qualities, namely their perceptions and appetitions. Monads’ 
 2 
perceptions are the means by which they each individually represent the world. 
Monads’ appetitions are the actions of the monads’ forces that impel them from one 
perception to the next, ensuring that the monads’ perceptions mirror the changes that 
occur in bodies as they move and resist one another in accordance with the laws of 
motion or efficient causes. Because each monad represents the whole world, they 
cannot be distinguished by the content of their perceptions, but they can be identified 
by the degrees of confusion or distinctness of their perceptions. This in turn is a result 
of the appetitive force that lies behind each perceptual state, such that the greater the 
appetition, the more distinct the resultant perception. Hence, ultimately, it is the 
degree of each monad’s active force, its essential nature, that serves to distinguish one 
monad from another and that determines the particular ‘point of view’ from which 
each monad perceives the world (Principles of Nature and Grace, §3: GP VI 599; AG 
207). 
 
Because they are indivisible and partless, the movement from one perception to the 
next cannot be accounted for in terms of any internal rearrangement of parts or 
transference of parts from one monad to another. ‘The monads’, as Leibniz famously 
put it, ‘have no windows through which something can enter or leave’ (Monadology 
§7: GP VI 607; AG 213). Consequently, every change in a monad must already be 
contained in its essence from the beginning, constituting a ‘law of the series’ that 
unfolds its perceptions in sequence and in harmony with the unfolding sequences of 
perceptions in all other monads. In this way, though there is no actual causal 
interaction among the monads, the appearance of interaction is maintained by their 
perfect synchronization:  
 
this concomitance I maintain is like several different bands of musicians or 
choirs separately playing their parts, and placed in such a way that they do not 
see and do not even hear each other, though they nevertheless can agree 
perfectly, each following his own notes, so that someone hearing all of them 
would find a marvelous harmony there (To Arnauld, 30 April 1687: GP II 95; 
AG 84). 
 
The ‘interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other’ 
(Monadology §56: GP VI 616; AG 220) is one reason why this is the best of all 
possible worlds. As Leibniz conceives perfection, the way to attain ‘as much 
perfection as possible’ is to produce as ‘much variety as possible, but with the greatest 
order possible’ (Monadology §58: GP VI 616; AG 220). This is achieved through the 
creation of an infinity of monads, each perceiving the same universe, but each 
perceiving it from its own individual perspective (Monadology §57).  
 
At the time of Leibniz’s death in 1716, the high esteem that he had enjoyed for the 
greater part of his life had all but disappeared. However, his reputation recovered 
dramatically on the publication of Latin translations of some of his most important 
works, including the Monadology, in the decade following his death. Their 
publication elicited wide and controversial discussion across Europe. By the middle 
of the eighteenth century Leibniz’s ‘monad’ became a concept of such central 
importance in German intellectual life that in 1746 Euler wrote that ‘the dispute about 
monads was so lively and general that… [e]veryone’s conversation fell upon monads 
everywhere and no one spoke of anything else’ (Cited and translated in Clark, 1999: 
446). Nonetheless, it was not until the 1760s that the first two collections of his 
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writings that revealed the enormous depth of his thought would be published: Rudolf 
Erich Raspe’s (1765) Oeuvres philosophiques, which included Leibniz’s New Essays 
(published for the very first time), and Louis Dutens’ (1768) Opera Omnia. 
 
During the earlier part of the century, Leibniz’s philosophy was closely associated 
with Christian Wolff’s and the latter’s philosophy was labelled by the German 
professor of philosophy and mathematics Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693-1750) as 
‘Leibniz-Wolffian’, much to Wolff’s disapproval. Despite this association, there were 
major differences between the two philosophers. For example, Wolff’s metaphysics 
was not an austere metaphysics of monads, but rather a form of dualism. However, 
Wolff’s theory of substance shared a close enough similarity for the concept of the 
‘monad’ to become a significant part of the Leibniz-Wolffian vocabulary, as can be 
seen in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s famous Leibniz-Wolffian textbook 
Metaphysics, §§392-418.1 Wolff’s greatest debt to Leibniz was for his theory of pre-
established harmony, which Wolff believed was the only satisfactory solution to the 
problem of the relationship between the mind and the body.  
 
The most historically significant philosophical engagement with Leibniz’s thought 
during the eighteenth century came from Immanuel Kant. Leibniz’s influence on Kant 
ran deep and touched almost every area of his philosophy. Yet at no point in Kant’s 
career could he straightforwardly be regarded as a Leibnizian. Even in his pre-critical 
days as the author of the Physical Monadology (1756) he was profoundly critical of 
certain characteristic elements of Leibniz’s thought. After having published his 
Critique of Pure Reason twenty-five years later, Kant became well known for having 
provided the most serious and unavoidable challenges for the pursuit of rationalist 
metaphysics that it had ever encountered. The crucial error of Leibniz’s rationalist 
method, Kant argued, was that Leibniz engaged in logical reflection without 
recognizing the unique role played by sensibility. He, therefore, ‘intellectualised 
appearances’ (A271/B327). According to Kant, the errors in Leibniz’s system are due 
to his failure to understand that our appearances are conditioned by sensibility and 
that if a concept is not applied in intuition, then it lacks objectivity. Although such 
concepts may have a logical meaning, they have no significance in the application to 
objects. The use of concepts outside of this relation is, Kant writes, ‘a mere play of 
imagination or of understanding’ (A239/B298). Therefore, Kant calls his critique of 
Leibniz ‘the critique of pure understanding’. For Kant, ‘[t]he pure categories, apart 
from any formal conditions of sensibility, have only transcendental significance; 
nevertheless they may not be employed transcendentally’ (A248/B305). This means 
that they have transcendental (idealist) significance insofar as they are the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of experience, but they have no transcendental (realist) 
use because they cannot be employed in arguments for the existence of entities that 
take us beyond appearances.  
 
According to the received view, Kant’s critical revolution put an end to the kind of 
metaphysics of which the monadology is the example par excellence. This volume 
will challenge this view and provide a far more nuanced version of philosophy’s 
‘post-Kantian’ tradition, spanning from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth-
century, by bringing to light a rich tradition of new monadologists, many of whom 
                                                        
1 On the relationship between Wolff and Leibniz’s philosophy see Wilson (1995), École 
(1997), Lamarra (2007) and Park (2007).  
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have been unjustifiably forgotten by contemporary historians of philosophy. Through 
this complex dialogue, the ‘monadology’ is shown to be a remarkably fecund 
hypothesis allowing for many possible variations and developments. By focusing on 
the monadology, therefore, the depth and breadth of the post-Kantian period is 
exposed in original and previously unexplored ways and the road is laid open for 
further research.  
 
This guest issue opens with Richard Fincham’s ‘Reconciling Leibnizian Monadology 
and Kantian Criticism’ in which he discusses some of the first attempts to return to a 
form of Leibnizian monadology without ignoring the crucial insights of Kant’s critical 
philosophy. Fincham argues that the Polish Lithuanian philosopher Solomon Maimon 
(1753-1800) and the German idealist F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) both highlight the 
problematic dualism between the intellect and sensibility at the heart of Kant’s 
philosophy. By focusing on the spirit rather than the letter of Kant’s work, Maimon 
and Schelling attempt to reconcile Leibniz and Kant. While Kant, they argue, cannot 
explain the connection between the concepts of the understanding and intuitions of 
sensibility. Leibniz is able to overcome the problem of the two-fold nature of 
cognitive faculties by conceiving both the understanding and sensibility as arising 
from the same monadic source.  
 
Maimon’s crucial claim is that what Kant conceived as synthetic a priori truths are in 
fact, insofar as they are in the infinite understanding, analytic truths, and only 
synthetic truths, insofar as they are appearances in the finite understandings. They are 
synthetic truths in the latter because of the limitations of the individual’s finite 
perspective. Just as in the Leibnizian monad, it is its limitations that give rise to sense 
perceptions and thus differentiate it from God, so too for Maimon, that is, in Kantian 
language, what is analytic in the infinite appears synthetic in the finite understanding. 
Fincham shows that Schelling similarly attempts to solve the same Kantian problems 
through his conception of what he describes as the ‘infinite spirit or Absolute subject’ 
that produces finite spirits, which, like monads, are windowless perspectives on the 
Absolute.  
  
The canonical reconstruction of the history of post-Kantian thought focuses on the 
monistic aspects that found their ultimate realization in the absolute idealism of 
Hegel. However, there is a less well-known but just as significant story that 
emphasizes the Leibnizian monadological pluralist aspects that were being developed 
even by Hegel’s contemporaries, such as Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) and 
Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848). Frederick Beiser picks up this later story in his article 
‘Herbart’s Monadology’. While many historians of philosophy have followed Hegel 
by presenting the history of philosophy leading to him from Kant as a smooth 
trajectory running through Fichte, Schelling up to Hegel himself, Beiser shows that 
the truth is much less tidy. While Hegel wanted to trace a history that would be 
completed in his own absolute Idealism, and as such placed greater emphasis on the 
monist tendencies in the history of philosophy, Beiser questions this neat sanitized 
version of the history of post-Kantian thought. Focusing on Herbart, he invokes a 
pluralist tradition running through the same historical periods, stemming not from 
Spinoza but from Leibniz. Like Maimon, Herbart develops what he calls a ‘critical 
monadology’ that takes seriously Kant’s critical philosophy but similarly sees a return 
to the Leibnizian metaphysics as a solution to the critical system’s failures. 
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Herbart considers his monadology as post- rather than pre-Kantian because he agrees 
with Kant’s critique of the rationalist method - especially his denial that existence is a 
predicate. Whereas for Kant, analysis of experience leads to transcendental idealism, 
for Herbart, the monadology is discovered through analysis of our experience and its 
most basic concepts. In keeping with Leibniz, Herbart argues that the rich diverse 
complexes given in experience must be grounded by simple metaphysical monads, 
which he calls ‘Reals’. Herbart claims that we cognitively construct space and time 
from our perceptions of simple things. Therefore, in Herbart’s account of the 
relationship between appearance and reality, space and time themselves are 
appearances of monads, understood in Leibnizian fashion as simple and self-
preserving beings. 
 
Peter Simons shows that Bolzano’s monadology develops the Leibnizian metaphysics 
in an even more realist fashion. Bolzano’s is a physical monadology, not unlike that 
of the early Kant’s. Bolzano’s monads are simple, fundamental, but yet exist in space. 
Bolzano represents a crucial chapter in the history of monadological metaphysics 
insofar as he made one of the boldest attempts to construct a physical monadology 
that could be reconciled with classical physics whilst using the rationalist a priori 
methodology, even though, as Simons argues here, the attempt was ultimately 
unsuccessful. The rationalist approach to the monadology is shown to fail, he argues, 
when the monads are understood purely as physical atoms.  
 
In agreement with Simons, the French monadologists, considered here in papers by 
Jeremy Dunham and Delphine Antoine–Mahut, believed that a consistent 
monadology could not be developed using the rationalist a priori method. 
Nonetheless, the French monadologists argued that Leibniz himself combined both a 
priori reasoning, on the one hand, with empirical evidence gleaned from introspective 
examination of the activities of one’s own mind, on the other. However, they 
maintained that the conclusions Leibniz drew when using the a priori method took 
him down a path that would, if continued, lead to Spinozistic pantheism and its 
consequent threats to freedom and individuality, while conversely the conclusions that 
he drew from the empirical side proved the existence of free individuals. Faced with 
these opposing and irreconcilable consequences of rationalist and empiricist, 
methodologies, the French monadologists chose to promote the latter. In contrast to 
the earlier thinkers from the Germanic tradition, they considered Kant’s critical 
philosophy as a dangerous scepticism rather than a profound philosophical revolution. 
Controversially, in ‘From Habit to Monads: Félix Ravaisson’s Theory of Substance’, 
Dunham argues that reading Ravaisson’s (1813-1900) philosophy as a dialogue with 
the post-Kantian tradition has been one of the major sources for misinterpretation of 
his work. Instead, Dunham shows that, correctly understood, Ravaisson uses the 
analysis of habit as an attempt to argue from empirical reflection to a pluralist 
metaphysics. In Antoine-Mahut’s paper, ‘Reviving Spiritualism with Monads: 
Francisque Boullier’s Impossible Mission (1839-64)’, we see how this French 
tradition continued to develop throughout the nineteenth century and why Francisque 
Boullier (1813-1899) believed that the monadology could be used to provide an 
alternative both to the passive Cartesian mechanism and to Scholastic animism and 
therefore to provide a metaphysics genuinely compatible with developments in the 
life sciences. 
 
Antoine-Mahut makes the broad historiographical point that the way that Leibniz was 
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understood and interpreted in this period was never as a philosopher in isolation but 
always in constellation both with his contemporaries Descartes and Stahl and also 
with the dialogues being developed within the French context itself. While attempts 
were made to understand Leibniz in his own intellectual context, e.g. in relation to 
Descartes and Stahl, his views were also regarded as making a significant contribution 
to the contemporary philosophical scene in nineteenth century France. Politically, it 
was advantageous to be able to align one’s own philosophy with that of the great 
Leibniz. Historiographically, of course, recognizing that one’s own reading of the 
history is itself historically situated calls in to question the very possibility and even 
desirability of reaching absolute objective truths in matters historical. By reflecting on 
this historical treatment of the history of philosophy Antoine-Mahut questions 
whether objectivity is something that could ever be obtained.  
 
In Britain too, Leibniz’s philosophy came to be seen not as an historical relic but as a 
living system to be worked with and adapted to suit a modern context. Perhaps the 
most ambitious attempt to develop the theory of monads into a full-blown 
metaphysical system compatible with the revolutions in both physics and biology that 
had occurred since Leibniz came from Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). As 
Pierfrancesco Basile shows in his article ‘Learning from Leibniz: Whitehead (and 
Russell) on Mind, Matter, and Monads’, Whitehead took issue with Leibniz’s 
substance ontology, subject-predicate logic and with his system of Pre-established 
harmony. In its place, Whitehead develops an ontology that sees the building blocks 
of reality as experiential processual units, called ‘actual occasions’. Whitehead 
himself admits that his theory of actual occasions is a theory of monads, but 
Whitehead’s monads progress through their mutual creative interaction rather than 
unfolding from their own substantial essences as do Leibniz’s. Although Basile 
argues that Whitehead’s attempt to reconstruct this theory in this way was not entirely 
successful, he nonetheless claims that Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is 
importantly suggestive for reconsidering the relationship between mind and matter. 
 
Whitehead was not the only British philosopher to construct a theory of monads 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Herbert Wildon Carr (1857-1931), James 
Ward (1843-1925), John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925) and Hilda Oakeley 
(1867-1950) all developed original monadologies. In her paper ‘British Idealist 
Monadologies and the Reality of Time’, Emily Thomas focuses on McTaggart and 
Oakeley and their attempts to understand the nature of time within a monadological 
framework. McTaggart’s arguments for the rejection of the reality of time are well-
known, but Oakeley’s critique of McTaggart and ultimate defence of the reality of 
time are much less so. Oakeley’s main argument again starts from experience and our 
personal perceptions of temporal passage. Thomas defends Oakeley’s argument and 
she also shows that Oakeley’s argument is generalizable to all monadologies. Any 
consistent monadological metaphysical system, Thomas contends, must affirm the 
existence of time.  
 
What we see in all these philosophers are attempts to engage with the history of 
philosophy in a way that Paul Lodge calls ‘dialogical history’. That is to say, each of 
them develops their own philosophical position in dialogue or through dialogue with 
Leibniz and his texts. In his paper ‘Heidegger on the Being of Monads’, after 
discussing Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) own attempt at dialogical history with 
Leibniz in his Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Lodge defends the virtues of a 
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methodological pluralism in the history of philosophy. The philosophical enterprise 
needs not only ‘exegetical’ historians of philosophy, but historical philosophers, and 
dialogical and creative historians of philosophy too, for, as Lodge argues, it is only 
when all four types of philosopher work together in a mutually collaborative 
intellectual enterprise that the best use is made of our discipline’s rich history. 
Furthermore, Lodge’s account of Heidegger’s engagement with Leibniz uncovers a 
number of non-standard and interesting aspects of Heidegger’s reading of the 
Monadology from which Leibniz scholars can learn. These include his understanding 
of the unifying nature of monads, force understood as drive, and the latter’s 
relationship with perception and appetite. Like a number of the monadologists 
discussed in this volume, Heidegger emphasizes the importance of Leibniz’s use of 
introspection for understanding the nature of monads. Importantly, Lodge shows how 
this focus on introspective methodology can be used to provide Leibniz scholars with 
hints on how to interpret Leibniz’s own understanding of monads.  
 
What Mogens Lærke finds in Gilles Deleuze’s (1925-1995) relationship with Leibniz 
is perhaps most aptly situated within the category of ‘creative history of philosophy’. 
According to Lærke, Deleuze’s Le Pli is not primarily a reading of Leibniz; it is 
instead a work of aesthetics that draws on an ahistorical reading of Leibniz’s thought 
as a ‘monadological metaphysics’. In his paper, ‘Five Figures of Folding. Deleuze on 
Leibniz's monadological metaphysics’, Lærke offers an exceptionally clear and 
insightful exposition of Deleuze’s use of Leibniz’s notion of the folds of bodies, of 
events, and of the monads that provide their logical and existential grounding. 
Although Lærke provides evidence that Deleuze’s focus on the fold is textually better 
grounded than the latter would have realized, he is critical of Deleuze’s ‘stubbornly 
synchronic’ approach to reading Leibniz. Therefore, he does not provide a defence of 
Deleuze’s reading, but rather he shows through the use of graphic figures that 
Deleuze’s use of the ‘fold-concept’ captures many of the basic elements of Leibniz’s 
philosophy in an ‘extraordinarily synthetic way’. Importantly, by doing so Lærke 
provides the key for Leibniz scholars to understand the specific contribution that 
Deleuze’s work makes to the scholarship, and at the same time the key for Deleuzians 
to understand the core insights that Deleuze takes from Leibniz’s work.  
 
Leibniz’s own aesthetics is the theme of the closing paper in this volume. Leibniz 
composed no treatise on aesthetics and his writings only rarely address the topic of 
beauty per se. However, his definition of beauty as ‘that, the contemplation of which 
is pleasant’ (Elements of Natural Law: A VI i 464: L 137) and his account of the 
perfection of individuals and of the world in terms of the maximization of ordered 
variety gave rise to Baumgarten’s rationalist aesthetics in the eighteenth century. In 
the context of contemporary positive aesthetics, it remains highly relevant today. In 
‘Leibniz’s Monadological Positive Aesthetics’, Pauline Phemister and Lloyd 
Strickland argue that the objective beauty of Leibniz’s monadological world, 
discoverable by natural scientific investigation but ultimately justified theologically 
by appeal to God’s decision to create the best possible world, constitutes a positive 
aesthetics that is both clearer and stronger than the secular positive aesthetics 
advanced in recent years by Allen Carlson. The rich history of the monadology shows 
that it has—for the last three hundred years—been regarded as a living philosophy, 
and that it is a remarkably fecund philosophical hypothesis capable of many possible 
developments without losing its distinctively Leibnizian character. Far from being 
extinguished by the Kantian critical revolution, therefore, the monadology continues 
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to have relevance today, and Phemister and Strickland focus on just one area of many 
in philosophy where it may have a future too. 
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